The IPO is dying. Marc Andreessen explains why.

By Timothy B. Lee

Twenty years ago, a 22-year-old Marc Andreessen co-founded Netscape, the company behind the first commercially successful web browser. Netscape went public the next year, making Andreessen wealthy and marking the start of the dot-com boom of the 1990s.

Today, Andreessen is a prominent venture capitalist at the firm Andreessen Horowitz. I asked him to talk about how the stock market has changed over the last two decades. In the 1990s, it was common for small companies to have initial public offerings (IPOs), in which they offer their shares for sale to the general public. But today, companies wait a lot longer to hold their IPOs.

For example, Netscape went public when it was worth a little more than $2 billion, and this wasn't unusual. For comparison, Twitter waited until it was worth about $25 billion before it went public last year. Facebook was worth more than $100 billion when it had its IPO in 2012.

Many companies aren't going public at all. For example, Google bought the home automation company Nest earlier this year for $3.2 billion. Two decades ago, Nest would have been more likely to hold an IPO.

In this interview, conducted on June 12, Andreessen offers his thoughts on why companies are waiting longer to IPO. He argues that the shift is bad for ordinary investors, who no longer have the opportunity to invest in fast-growing technology firms. He also offers his thoughts on the work of Thomas Piketty, a French economist who has studied the growing gap between rich and poor.

The transcript has been edited for length and clarity

Timothy B. Lee: The day you took Netscape public in 1994, it was worth around $2.2 billion ($3.5 billion in today's dollars). Recently, companies have been waiting a lot longer to go public. What do you think has changed?

Marc Andreessen: There's been an absolutely dramatic change. What you say is exactly right. Twenty years ago, IPOs had gotten democratized. You had Microsoft able to go public at less than $1 billion valuation. If you invested in Microsoft's IPO and held you had the prospect in the public market of a 1,000-times gain. There were a whole bunch of other comparable situations over the years. With Oracle, most of the gain was in the public market. In prior eras, the same was true of IBM and Hewlett Packard. These companies primarily grew up in the public market.

Ironically, you just had a much calmer market. You had a much bigger percentage of mutual funds instead of hedge funds, and you actually had more individual participation in the market a lot of the time. It's dramatic how much individual participation has dropped relative to funds. Individuals who wanted to be in growth stocks, institutions like mutual funds that wanted to be in growth stocks who would be longs. [E.g. they were buying assets and holding them in hopes of long-term investment returns.]

You also had a relatively benign regulatory environment, pre-Sarbanes-Oxley [corporate governance legislation enacted in the wake of the Enron scandal] and before all the other kind of corporate reforms that had taken place. In that environment it was actually quite hospitable [to be a public company].

Basically that all started to change after 2000. A whole set of "closing the barn door after the horse had run out" kind of things happened. Sarbanes-Oxley happened. The irony of Sarbanes-Oxley was that it was intended to prevent more Enrons and Worldcoms but it ended up being a gigantic tax on small companies.

Timothy B. Lee: What is it about Sarbanes-Oxley that makes it so burdensome?

Marc Andreessen:The compliance and reporting requirements are extremely burdensome for a small company. It requires fleets of lawyers and accountants who come in and do years of work. It's this idea that if you control everything down to the nth detail, nothing will go wrong. It's this bizarre, bureaucratic, top-down mentality that if only we could make everything predictable, then everything would be magic, everything would be wonderful.

It has the opposite effect. It's biased enormously toward companies that are big enough to hire fleets of lawyers and accountants, biased against companies that are very young and for whom there's still a lot of variability.

The second thing that happened is Regulation Fair Disclosure. The idea is that as a company officer, you are not, under extreme penalties, permitted to give one shareholder information that another does not have. It has really curtailed the ability of companies to communicate with shareholders. It puts everything under more scrutiny with a lot more risk.

You might say that's a good idea, shareholders should be treated equally. The problem is the shareholder base itself has changed dramatically. You've had a dramatic rise in hedge funds. Very short-term trading and dramatic rise in short-selling [investors betting that a stock's price will fall]. If you're a public company, you become the shuttlecock between warring longs and shorts. They bat your stock around like it's a chew toy.

Most American retirement savings is invested in the public stock market. That raises the societal question of how are we going to pay for retirements.

The shorts will just make stuff up. They will make up rumors and innuendo and stuff you wouldn't believe. I went through this personally myself. Crazy levels of personal rumors, all kinds of just horrendous things. There's this tremendous gaming of the stock price. They use Yahoo message boards and chat rooms.

So then you're the company, and you're dealing with these crazy rumors and all this crazy activity every day. A rumor comes out that your executive is ill. A rumor comes out saying that you lost a big contract. A rumor comes out that you're running short of cash. Normally someone would call you up, [ask if the rumor was true], and you'd say no. But under Regulation FD you can't do that. So the running joke is what you need to start putting out a daily fact sheet saying here's all the things that are said about us that's not true.

It's technically illegal to manipulate the market. But there are hardly ever any cases [enforcing these laws]. Basically the hedge funds run absolutely wild and do whatever they want.

And then there's like 8 more of these things. There are these really abstract, theoretical approaches to corporate governance that wind up being embedded in your business. And the rise of continuous internet journalism, so you're in this continuous 24-hour news cycle about everything involving your company.

Timothy B. Lee: Why is a fluctuating stock price such a big deal? Can't the CEO just ignore it?

Marc Andreessen:This comes across like I'm complaining about how hard it is to be public and of course the answer is that you need to suck it up.

But for young companies, everything is connected: stock price, employee morale, ability to recruit new employees, ability to retain employees, ability to sign customer contracts,  ability to raise debt financing, ability to deal with regulators. Every single part of your business ends up being connected and it ends up being tied back to your stock price.

The problem is when your stock price gets hammered by any of this stuff, when your stock price gets hit by a false rumor, that in itself can destabilize your company. These companies that go public too quick are at risk of going into a death spiral at any moment in a way that's super intense and very difficult to get out of it because it becomes self-reinforcing.

And the kicker on all of this is: God help you if you ever need to raise money again. The shorts will drive your stock to zero to prevent you from raising money. So you are in extreme mortal danger if you're public and you need to raise money.

The result of all that is the effective death of the IPO. The number of public companies in the US has dropped dramatically. And then correspondingly, growth companies go public much later. Microsoft went out at under $1 billion, Facebook went out at $80 billion. Gains from the growth accrue to the private investor, not the public investor.

Most American retirement savings is invested in the public stock market. Most Americans can't invest in private companies and most Americans can't invest in venture capital and private equity funds. They're actually prohibited from doing so by the SEC. If you both prohibit them from investing in private growth and wire the market so they can't get into public growth, then you can't be invested in growth. That raises the societal question of how are we going to pay for retirements. That's the question that needs to be asked that nobody asks because it's too scary.

Timothy B. Lee: Do you think this is something that can be reversed?

Marc Andreessen:My belief is that there are a set of market reforms that could happen that would reverse all this. The problem is that all the political momentum is in the other direction. There's a reason for that. When there's a problem, the answer is presumed to be more regulation — even when the regulation was the problem in the first place. This is the central flaw in how the government operates.

This is so powerful in the conventional wisdom right now. I love the Daily Show like everyone else does. But literally [Jon Stewart's] answer to every issue is Congress should pass a law. [People think you can] solve any problem by passing enough laws.

I don't see the world getting less dramatic. I don't see the world calming down.

The loop we're in now is that people are getting upset and disappointed by the stock market. There are no growth stocks, which means there's no growth. Stock market returns have been weak for 15 years, which is exactly what you'd expect if you took all the growth out. Everyone is upset the stock market isn't performing. The worse the results get, the more regulation you get. It's in its own kind of doom loop. Unless something happens to shock the system a lot, our assumption is it gets worse, not better.

This has had a big influence on how we set up our firm. We've set up our firm to basically not have to take companies public. We basically have a 15-year lockup on our money, which is longer than you used to do with private capital. One of the reasons why our funds are so much larger than venture capital funds used to be is because we have to have the firepower to finance companies through the point of time where we take them public. For our investors this is kind of fine. Our investors are these big institutions, university endowments, high net worth family money, private foundations. They're fine. They can invest in us. They can invest in venture capital. Joe retiree, who works hard for 40 years and has his money in the public stock market, he can't do that.

Timothy B. Lee: This relates to another topic I wanted to ask about. You've had some harsh wordsfor Thomas Piketty, the French economist whose new book is trendy in liberal circles right now. Do you think he's right that we're going to see a growing gap between the rich and the poor in the coming years?

Marc Andreessen:The funny thing about Piketty is that he has a lot more faith in returns on invested capital than any professional investor I've ever met. It's actually very interesting about his book. This is exactly what you'd expect form a French socialist economist. He assumes it's really easy to put money in the market for 40 years or 80 years or 100 years and have it compound at these amazing rates. He never explains how that's supposed to happen.

Every investment manager I know is sweating the opposite problem, which is: what do I do? Where do I get the growth? I can't get into the public market, so I have to go into the private market. The problem in the private market is there isn't much growth. Maybe a dozen hedge funds. After that they're not that good. The returns degrade down to S&P 500 levels.

Timothy B. Lee: That's not so bad is it? The S&P 500 has returned 6 or 7 percent real growth for the last few decades.

Marc Andreessen:Yeah, 6 or 7 percent. But if you look at the last 15 years they're much less than that. Jeremy Siegel put out his book about how there's never been a 10-year period where you lose money in the stock market — right at the beginning of a very long period where you lose money for 10-plus years.

Piketty thinks it's really easy to compound capital at scale. There's just a lot of evidence that that's not true. The shining example of that is: where are all the big companies and the big families?

If you look at what's actually happening in the Forbes 400 and the Fortune 500, churn is accelerating. One year it's some real estate family, and then the next year it's like, "There's Larry Page, where did he come from?" Somehow Piketty looks through that to a world where all this change is going to just stop. [He has] this idea that normal is 18th-century feudal France, and we're going to go back to it.

He does this other dodge where the 20th century doesn't conform to his theory, but that's because of the wars and economic dislocations. And so it's like the 21st century is predicted to be much more peaceful and calm. I don't know about you but that's not what I see happening. I look around the world right now and I see exciting things happening that's causing a lot of changes.

It's not an accident that Piketty named his book after Das Capital. It's a very "capitalists are evil, it's all going to roll up to a few rich people" kind of thing.

The other irony in the book is that on the positive side, [people around the world are] rising up from what we would consider destitution, to what we would consider lower-class lifestyles on their way to middle-class lifestyles. Conversely, Iraq is falling again.

So I don't see the world getting less dramatic. I don't see the world calming down. I don't understand why that would be the expectation. At what point is all of this progress and change and disruption going to stop to basically let rich people cement their gains and then earn these great returns in perpetuity. When is that supposed to start?

Maybe that's what happening in France, but it doesn't map to anything I see. What's happening in France is the opposite, which is that all the rich people are leaving, as a consequence of the government he's advising. The irony here is very deep.

Timothy B. Lee: Piketty's argument doesn't require extraordinary returns, does it? He finds the historical return is around 5 percent. The long-run return in the US stock market has been higher than that.

Marc Andreessen:If you actually get regular compounding growth of stocks of that form, then basically what you have is an economic boom — a sustained boom in productivity. If the gains from the market exceed the gains from economic growth, the delta is productivity growth. That's the math. This is why I say he has so much more faith in the progress of capitalism that even the capitalists do.

What all the capitalists are worried about is where's the productivity growth. This is where Piketty's analysis is actually a very optimistic analysis. It suggests you're going to have a gigantic productivity boom. Isn't that the world we want to live in?

Think about what happens in that world, though. Unbelievable progress, unbelievable productivity growth, unbelievable increase in standard of living all across the planet. Somehow as a consequence of that, everything is going to stabilize and we're going to go back to feudal France. At that point it becomes Marxist logic.

There's a missing step in there where everyone but the hereditary elite gets screwed. And he never explains that part. Because if you're having all this economic growth, and everything is getting better, but somehow you're in this dystopian world where there's a few rich people and a lot of poor people, that doesn't add up. It's a really, really Marxist way of looking at the world.

It's not an accident that Piketty named his book after Das Capital. It's a very "capitalists are evil, it's all going to roll up to a few rich people" kind of thing. Marx was wrong. That's literally not what happened. For it to happen now, with the economy being the way it is now, which is so much even more dynamic than it was in Marx's time, [seems unlikely].

If you talk to anyone in the French socialist party, their worldview on how capitalism works is completely backwards from anything you see in the real world. Piketty has taken that and created abstract models and marshaled some data and presented it in book form.

Update: Andreessen originally told me that stock market returns had been "flat" for 15 years. While inflation-adjusted returns have been below average during this period, they have been positive (for example, S&P 500 returns averaged 2.2 percent from January 1999 to December 2013). With Andreessen's approval, I've changed it to say that stock market returns have been "weak" instead of "flat."

Our very own Jeff Jones at the Advanced Manufacturing Forum at USC

The California Network for Manufacturing Innovation (CNMI) held an Advanced Manufacturing Forum on June 24, 2014 at USC Davidson Conference Center. This is the second event organized by CNMI in the past year. CNMI is a California statewide Innovation HUB (iHUB) and a broad-based collaborative that includes: the California Manufacturing Extension Partnership Centers (CMTC andManex), Lawrence Livermore National LaboratoryLawrence Berkeley National Laboratory , University of California IrvineEl Camino College,Centers for Applied Competitive TechnologiesUniversity of Southern California Center for Economic DevelopmentCity of Davis and i-Gate.

Our vice president Jeff Jones had the pleasure of moderating the Q&A session in the afternoon. Way to represent Mr. Jeff Jones!

What It Will Take to Create the Next Great Silicon Valleys (Plural)

Photo: Patrick Nouhailler/ Flickr

BY MARC ANDREESSEN

The popular recipe for creating the “next” Silicon Valley goes something like this:

*Build a big, beautiful, fully equipped technology park;
*Mix in R&D labs and university centers;
*Provide incentives to attract scientists, firms, and users;
*Interconnect the industry through consortia and specialized suppliers;
*Protect intellectual property and tech transfer; and
*Establish a favorable business environment and regulations.

Except … this approach to innovation clusters hasn’t really worked. Some have even dismissed these government-driven efforts as “modern-day snake oil.” Yet policymakers are always searching for the next Silicon Valley because of the critical link between tech innovation, economic growth, and social opportunity.

Previous efforts at such clusters failed for a variety of reasons, but one big reason is that government efforts alone simply don’t draw people. That’s why a recent crop of experiments has focused more on building entrepreneurial communities, urban hubs and districts, and hacker spaces. Still, we’re “splitting the logic” on how to create an innovation ecosystem, according to MIT expert Fiona Murray in Technology Review: We’re either going top-down by focusing primarily on infrastructure — plunking down an office park next to a university — or bottom-up by focusing on just the networks. None of these efforts successfully pursue both paths at once, with government, academia and entrepreneurial communities proceeding together in lockstep … as was the case in the development of Silicon Valley.

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But policymakers shouldn’t be trying to copy Silicon Valley. Instead, they should be figuring out what domain is (or could be) specific to their region — and then removing the regulatory hurdles for that particular domain. Because we don’t want 50 Silicon Valleys; we want 50 different variations of Silicon Valley, all unique from each other and all focusing on different domains.

Imagine a Bitcoin Valley, for instance, where some country fully legalizes cryptocurrencies for all financial functions. Or a Drone Valley, where a particular region removes all legal barriers to flying unmanned aerial vehicles locally. A Driverless Car Valley in a city that allows experimentation with different autonomous car designs, redesigned roadways and safety laws. A Stem Cell Valley. And so on.

There’s a key difference from the if-you-build-it-they-will-come argument of yore. Here, the focus is more on driving regulatory competition between city, state, and national governments. There are many new categories of innovation out there and entrepreneurs eager to go after opportunities within each of them. Rethinking the regulatory barriers in specific industries would better draw the startups, researchers and divisions of big companies that want to innovate in the vanguard of a particular domain — while also exploring and addressing many of the difficult regulatory issues along the way.

Why this approach? Compared with previous innovation-cluster efforts where governments contrived to do something unnatural, this proposal flows from what governments naturally do best: create, or rather, relax laws.

Another advantage of this approach is that it’s a way for clusters to differentiate from each other and successfully compete for resources. Think of it as a sort of “global arbitrage” around permissionless innovation – the freedom to create new technologies without having to ask the powers that be for their blessing. Entrepreneurs can take advantage of the difference between opportunities in different regions, where innovation in a particular domain of interest may be restricted in one region, allowed and encouraged in another, or completely legal in still another.For example, the laws and guidelines for using drones or taxing bitcoin already vary widely across the globe, just as they do for ride-sharing services across different cities in the U.S.

But the biggest advantage of the 50-different-Silicon Valleys approach isn’t just in what it affords isolated regions or entrepreneurs — it’s in accelerating innovation everywhere. Removing regulations across different regions allows multiple innovation categories to advance together at once, in parallel, without being bottlenecked by time or place.

So what are the risks? Well, there’s a real possibility that advanced regions will essentially outsource or “regulate away” their own risk at the expense of less advanced ones. To get ahead, poorer countries may become more tempted to take on the very things wealthier countries are fencing out of their borders. But as long as the innovations aren’t life-threatening — and many of the restricted domains aren’t (the restrictions are often protecting incumbent interests) — a model like this one provides a much faster and more feasible way for developing regions to catch up. Especially when you consider the advantage that previous innovation clusters didn’t have: mobile.

With 5.9 billion smartphone users coming online in five years — largely due to the developing world — mobile acts not just as a leveler, but as a multiplier. As Tim Worstall argues:

One way of thinking about economic growth…is that it’s all about the adoption of new technologies of production. We could say that the introduction of electricity was itself economic growth, or that the adoption of smartphones will be. However, they’re both multiplying technologies: electricity allows more work to be done by replacing muscle power and, through light, enables work or study to be done for more hours of the day. The smartphone opens up the books of human knowledge to those who have never had access to it before. And that is seriously going to accelerate economic growth in just about every other field as well. That peasant farmer trying to manage his acre of maize using nothing but a hoe and a machete: sure, he’s not going to be the world’s greatest user of Facebook…but he will benefit massively from information about weather, market prices, and better farming practices.

Because of mobile, removing regulatory hurdles goes from being a potentially vicious cycle to a more virtuous one that can help millions of people climb out of poverty. And the next big companies wouldn’t be built in the U.S., but elsewhere in the world instead. For example, as mobile payment systems like M-Pesa create opportunities in banking, risk-sharing, and more, they’ve expanded to areas outside of Africa as well —including Europe.

Meanwhile, allowing more experimentation in financial services could help those in countries that don’t have stable currencies (let alone banks) to more easily save and move their money across borders; some of these places would leapfrog, innovation-wise, through something like bitcoin. As for other domains, if we think of airspace as the next Internet-like platform, lifting restrictions on drones is one way to give other regions a chance to become the next significant locus of innovation.

In fact, this kind of competition is probably the only way to create successful innovation clusters that can compete with the huge advantage Silicon Valley already has. In the United States, the “death of distance” due to improvements in communications technologies has historically benefited only ideas-producing places like New York, but not goods-producing ones like Detroit. That’s why turning Detroit into a commercial Drone Valley could draw the innovative people who in turn want to be near other innovative people around that domain.

It’s already happening in places like Brazil, which are becoming known for being commercial drone-regulation friendly. It’s also happening in other domains, as genetic reporting companies like 23andme are forced to explore opportunities abroad, athletes go to places like Germany for biologic medicine, and even Japan considers slashing regulatory red tape to attract more drug R&D. But these examples are more reactive than proactive; I’m arguing for cities, states and countries to more systematically consider and create their regulatory competitive advantage. (If you don’t know what that advantage is, the best place to start is with local universities. Have a special competency in materials science? Then begin there.)

This kind of regulatory arbitrage is already happening in the United States, too, through innovations like Google Fiber. Instead of the traditional model where telecoms competed to be in a particular city neighborhood, cities are the ones competing to get Google Fiber. And the ones most willing to relax their oft-arbitrary regulations and fees are the ones getting it.

That’s another advantage of the regulatory arbitrage approach: It helps shake upregulatory capture altogether. The best defense of regulation is its use in protecting consumer interests, but the reality is that agencies and incumbents tend to watch out for their own entrenched interests and extract rents instead.

* * *

There are cultural factors at play here, of course. After all, Silicon Valley isn’t just a place — it’s a state of mind.

But instead of arguing about whether the Silicon Valley mindset cannot or should be copied, we need to shift our attention to an approach that addresses what Silicon Valley alone can’t do, while also creating opportunities for a broader set of people. To do that we need 50 different Silicon Valleys, not 50 failed clones.


Business Intelligence Solutions for Manufacturers - LAEDC ft. D. Lavinsky

LAEDC is hosting a webinar session featuring our president Dave Lavinsky!

Details:

June 26, 2014

12:00pm - 1:00pm (PST)

Free Webinar  

RSVP

Join us on June 26 for a discussion with Dave Lavinsky, President with Growthink. Guiding Metrics provides real-time business intelligence to help manufacturers move past cost cutting and lean manufacturing methods to become even more efficient, more competitive and more profitable.

The webinar provides a step by step walk through of the major metrics and systems Guiding Metrics has found in most clients and how the dashboard can be relevant to growing manufacturing businesses.The session will then be followed by Q & A.


This webinar is part of LAEDC's new Better Business Webinar Series.  

There is no cost to attend this webinar.   

Register to attend here.

Learn more about how the LAEDC can assist your company in coming to, expanding in, and staying within Los Angeles County.  

Here are the apps teens actually love, in 5 charts

June 19, 2014 11:20 AM 
Gregory Ferenstein
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Teens. Since the beginning of humanity, they’ve always represented what the future of humanity would look like. Now, thanks to a new survey, we have an idea of what kinds of websites, apps, and online services the future of humanity will enjoy– at least for the next few years of existence. Then, an entirely new crop of startups replaces the upstarts that recently rose to power.

Curator startup Niche conducted a sizable survey of 7,000 teens, and this is what it found:

Popularity in general

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Facebook and Youtube reign supreme, with 61 percent and 55 percent of daily active users, respectively. Instagram and the Facebook-nemesis team over at Snapchat are neck-and-neck in the race for photo sharing apps (around 50 percent).

Signs are good for the beleaguered micro-messaging app, Twitter, with 35 percent, a trend that has seen dramatic growth over the past two years.

The sad panda award goes to Foursquare, with a self-reported zero-percent daily active userbase among teens (3 percent overall). Of course, there are certainly teens that use Foursquare daily, but not enough to be picked up in a pretty large survey.

Finally, no shocker: The largely unemployed slice of teens legally required to attend high school do not spend much time polishing their Linkedin Profiles (2 percent daily use) — this in spite of LinkedIn’sefforts to court college applicants.

The Atlantic’s Derek Thompson has a nice graph ranking all of the popular websites/services by daily use.

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News

Teens must love listicles and sideboob stories: 15 percent report reading Buzzfeed occasionally, and 21 percent visit the Huffington Post. The Onion and Reddit are tied for the semi-serious news gold medal, at about 10 percent of occasional users.

news

Entertainment

YouTube dominates video with 55 percent daily users. The fact that Hulu is at around 23 percent of daily users is more evidence that teens aren’t just watching TV online — they are watching traditional TV programming much less.

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Pandora leads the pack on music (37 percent), meaning that discovery could be more important than random access(14 percent report using Spotify, and 32 percent, iTunes).

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Story here

You can see the full survey here.

The Data Behind the CNBC Disruptor 50

Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers has invested in 20% of companies on the CNBC Disruptor 50. The companies on the list have raised a whopping $3.75B in 2014 already.

CNBC recently released its second annual Disruptor 50 list – a list of 50 private companies nominated by venture capital firms and accelerators that ranges from household consumer mobile apps like Uber and Snapchat to green tech firms including Cool Planet andChargepoint. Given interest around the list, we used CB Insights data to crunch the numbers behind the financing trends, most well-funded cos and top investors of CNBC’s selected private companies.

The data below.

It must be the money

CNBC’s list of companies includes a number of well-funded startups – with some, includingAirBnB and Pinterest, having raised war chests well into the hundreds of millions to date. The chart below highlights the deal and dollar fundraising trend by the CNBC Disruptor 50 from 2009 through 2014 year-to-date. Yes, companies on the list have increasingly raised huge sums of cash – already topping $3.75 billion (with a B) in 2014 alone behind mega rounds toUber, AirBnB and Dropbox.

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Kleiner Perkins is top investor in CNBC 50 companies

Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers is the most represented venture capital firm on the list of CNBC 50 companies, with 10 of the startups in its portfolio including Shape Security,AngelList and Quirky. We’d earlier highlighted Kleiner’s robust list of Tech IPO Pipeline companies. SV Angel and Founders Fund round out the top 3 with 9 and 8 companies on the list, respectively. Interestingly, active tech mutual fund investor T. Rowe Price is tied for fourth most companies with late-stage investments including ApptioPure Storage andRedfin.

A list of all the investors with five or more companies on the CNBC Disruptor 50 is below.

cnbc50investors

Most well-funded – Uber on top

The chart below highlights the range of funding totals behind the 50 companies from under $20M (Kickstarter) to over $1B (Uber). 72% of companies on the list have raised between $20M and $150M, with 15 companies on the list raising between $50M-$100M and another 11 raising between $20M-$50M.

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See below for the list of the CNBC 50 ranked by total funding raised (credit/debt, secondary transactions not included).
Uber
Palantir Technologies
AirBnB
Pinterest
Dropbox
Spotify
Pure Storage
MongoDB
Lending Club
10 DocuSign
11 SpaceX
12 Quirky
13 Moderna
14 Oscar Health Insurance Co.
15 Cool Planet Energy Systems
16 Apptio
17 Snapchat
18 Zuora
19 Stripe
20 Warby Parker
21 Yext
22 Twilio
23 Chargepoint
24 GitHub
25 Aereo
26 Redfin
27 Etsy
28 Skybox Imaging
29 Motif Investing
30 Bill.com
31 Birchbox
32 Fon
33 Shape Security
34 Wealthfront
35 Kymeta
36 EcoMotors
37 Personal Capital
38 Rent the Runway
39 Dataminr
40 BrightRoll
41 Betterment
42 Fullscreen
43 TransferWise
44 Coinbase
45 Hampton Creek Foods
46 Kumu Networks
46 Nebula
48 AngelList
49 Nexmo
50 KickStarter

Growthink president on the power of real-time BI

Two weeks ago we had the honor of having Growthink president, Dave Lavinsky, in our Los Angeles office for a lunch presentation on the power of business intelligence and real-time dashboards.

Participants from various sectors had the opportunity to interact with Dave and walk through key metrics that should be more effectively tracked to contribute to better company success.

Thank you Dave for your time and look forward to many more of these sessions in the future!